报告题目：Incentives and Social Preferences: Experimental Evidence from a Seemingly Inefficient Traditional Labor Contract

报告人：Yasuyuki Sawada

时间：2016年10月13日(周四)15：30-17：00

地点：经济学院(中惠楼)102会议室

报告人简介：泽田康幸（Yasuyuki Sawada），现任东京大学经济系教授，于1996年和1999年分别获得斯坦福大学经济学硕士和博士学位，曾担任世界银行发展研究组和亚洲发展银行访问研究员，斯坦福大学和韩国大学访问教授，澳大利亚国立大学AJRC副研究员，巴基斯坦发展经济研究所（PIDE）、孟加拉国发展经济研究所（BIDS）等研究机构的研究员。现主要研究领域为发展经济学、应用微观计量经济学、灾害经济学和随机实验。Yasuyuki Sawada教授曾在多个发展中国家和地区开展不同的政策评估项目，包括教育、医疗、基础设施和小微企业等项目。他的研究课题也涉及到发达国家和发展中国家个人或家庭灾后经济行为分析，以及日本金融危机后社会出现的自杀现象的经济学分析。

摘要：This paper investigates the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in formulating rice planting contracts in the Philippines. In our study area, despite the potential for pervasive opportunistic behaviors by workers, a fixed-wage (FW) contract has been dominant for rice planting. To account for the use of this seemingly inefficient contractual arrangement, we adopt a hybrid experimental method of framed field experiments by randomized controlled trials (RCT), in which we randomly assign three distinct labor contracts—FW, individual piece rate (IPR), and group piece rate (GPR)—and artefactual field experiments to elicit social preference parameters. Through analyses of individual workers’ performance data from framed field experiments and data on social preferences elicited by artefactual field experiments, three main empirical findings emerge. First, our basic results show the positive incentive effects in IPR and, equivalently, moral hazard problems in FW, which are consistent with standard theoretical implications. Second, non-monetary incentives seem to play a significant role under FW: while social preferences such as altruism and guilt aversion play an important role in stimulating incentives under FW, introducing monetary incentives crowds out such intrinsic motivations, and other nonmonetary factors such as positive peer effects significantly enhance incentives under a FW contract. Finally, as alternative hypotheses, our empirical results are not necessarily consistent with the hypothesis of the interlinked contract of labor and credit transactions in mitigating moral hazard problems, the optimality of FW contract under large effort measurement errors, and the intertemporal incentives arising from performance-based contract renewal probabilities. Hence, considering the interplay of intrinsic motivations and monetary incentives as well as the monetary costs of mitigating moral hazard and free-riding problems through IPR, we may conclude that seemingly perverse traditional contractual arrangements might be socially efficient.