报告题目：Consumer  Awareness and Strategic Choice of Polices in Mixed Oligopoly with Free Entry

报告人：王凤生

时间：2017年4月14日下午3:30-5:00

地点：经济学院(中惠楼) 102室

报告人简介

    王凤生（1950-）教授，系高雄大学原副校长、应用经济学系创系系主任、荣誉讲座教授、博士生导师，现任中南财经政法大学文澜学院讲座教授和东南大学经济管理学院客座教授。1980年获美国普渡大学经济学博士学位，早期从事宏观经济学研究，1990年获常任轨聘职后的两年（1992年）回到“国立中山大学”创立经济研究所并任企业管理系教授，开始从事产业组织领域的研究，累计在Journal of Development Economics（独立作者）, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management（独立作者）, Journal of Macroeconomics（独立作者）,Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Journal of Economics, Economics Letters, Economic Modelling, National Tax Journal, Southern Economic Journal, Economic Systems, Review of World Economics, Review of International Economics, International Review of Economics and Finance等SSCI期刊发表论文四十多篇，单篇最高被引80多次，在国际上的主流国有经济研究领域“混合寡头（Mixed Oligopoly）”发表论文数量排位前十，并曾在《中国工业经济》、《世界经济》、《经济学动态》等中文权威期刊发表论文，自上世纪九十年代始全面参与台湾地区国有企业民营化改革的政府决策咨议，长期担任台湾地区“行政院”经济、劳动、科研事务顾问，是东亚地区资深的国有经济专家。现任Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Comparative Economics, , Journal of Development Economics Southern Economic Journal, Canadian Journal of Economics, Economica, Economics Letters, Journal of Economics, Economic Systems, Economic Modeling, Journal of Macroeconomics等期刊的匿名审稿人。

报告摘要:

    In this paper, we investigate the optimal environmental and privatization policies in a mixed oligopoly, wherein firms produce differentiated goods with environmental damage that is measured by government and observed by consumers. Furthermore, we re-examine the environment taxes or subsidies that are levied or provided at regulated entry and free entry showing how privatization affects environment damage and social welfare. We find that in both mixed and private oligopoly with regulated entry or free entry, the emission tax/subsidy could be provided. Emission taxes are charged when the market power and consumer cognition of pollution are low, while the production pollution is large. However, when the consumers’ cognition of pollution damage is increasing and the consumers are willing to pay less for any polluted good(s), the government should choose a lower emission tax or even provide a subsidy. We demonstrate that the number of the private firms at free-entry differentiated oligopoly after the public firm is privatized is socially inefficient even though the consumers have more choice of product varieties.